Contracts—Effect of Specific Disclaimer on Introduction of Evidence of Fraud by Buffalo Law Review
Buffalo Law Review 
Volume 9 Number 1 Article 28 
10-1-1959 
Contracts—Effect of Specific Disclaimer on Introduction of 
Evidence of Fraud 
Buffalo Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Buffalo Law Review, Contracts—Effect of Specific Disclaimer on Introduction of Evidence of Fraud, 9 Buff. 
L. Rev. 69 (1959). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol9/iss1/28 
This The Court of Appeals Term is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital 
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an 
authorized editor of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact 
lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
COURT OF APPEALS, 1958 TERM
on the ground that the rule is intended as a disability to the plaintiff, and not
a protection to the defendant.10 If the instant case is viewed in this manner, the
outcome hinges on whether the whole plan or merely the Gamoja-Corti transfer
is characterized as the illegal transaction. The plaintiff must rely on the
assignment or it has no claim at all. This assignment would seem to be an
essential part of the illegal transaction and, if the second statement of the
rule is applied, the result reached by the minority would seem correct.
EFFECT OF SPECIFIC DISCLAIMER ON INTRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE OF FRAUD
In Danann Realty Corp. v. Harris" the Court repeated its adherence to
the basic tenet that "..... a general merger clause is ineffective to exclude parol
evidence to show fraud in inducing the contract... ,"1 but the plaintiff buyer
in this instance had, as did the plaintiff in Cohen v. Cohen,'3 specifically dis-
claimed reliance on representations not embodied in the contract.
The trial courts' order, reversed by the Appellate Division in a memo-
randum opinion which refused to extend the holding in Cohen,'4 was reinstated
by the Court of Appeals' decision that it would be impossible for the plaintiff to
prove reliance since the specific disclaimer of reliance on enumerated representa-
tions destroyed the allegation in the complaint that he had in fact relied.
This was especially so since the plaintiff had means available to him ". .. of
knowing, by the exercise of ordinary intelligence, the truth, or the real quality
of the subject of the representation....". 5
In Cohen, as in the instant case, the dissenting opinion urged that since
fraud vitiates every contract, and since the law recognizes the ineffectiveness
of a general merger clause to preclude proof of fraud, there should be no
distinction made between a general and specific disclaimer since the former
includes the latter, and fraud is fraud.' 6
Contrary to the dissent, 17 the majority holding properly considered a
conflicting principle that required maintaining a contract's effectiveness as
an instrument of agreement.' 8 As the court indicated in Ernst Iron Works v.
10. Carr v. Hoy, 2 N.Y.2d 185, 158 N.Y.S.2d 572 (1957).
11. 5 N.Y.2d 317, 184 N.Y.S.2d 599 (1959).
12. Bridger v. Goldsmith, 143 N.Y. 424, 38 N.E. 458 (1894); Jackson v. State of
New York, 210 App. Div. 115, 205 N.Y.S. 658, aff'd 241 N.Y. 563, 150 N.E. 556 (1925);
A general merger clause is a general provision in the contract to the effect that the entire
understanding of the parties is included in the agreement. See: The Merger Clause and Its
Application to Fraud, 6 BROoLYN LAW REviEw 446 (1937), 3 Williston, Contracts §§ 811,
811A (Rev. Ed., 1936).
13. 1 A.D.2d 586, 151 N.Y.S.2d 949, aff'd 3 N.Y.2d 813, 166 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1957).
In this case, a contract designed to settle pending marital litigation, provided that the
husband had made no representations concerning reconciliation, and the wife's later attempt
to bring suit alleging misrepresentation of the husband's intent on reconciliation was
rejected by the court.
14. Danann Realty Corp. v. Harris, 6 A.D.2d 674, 174 N.Y.S.2d 219 (1st Dep't 1958).
15. Supra note 11 at 322, 184 N.Y.S.2d 599, 603 (1959).
16. Supra note 11 at 325, 184 N.Y.S.2d 599, 607 (1959).
17. Justice Fuld dissenting.
18. Supra note 11 at 323, 184 N.Y.S.2d 599, 604 (1959).
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Duralith Corp.,'9 where the plaintiff attempted to show reliance on the mis-
representation of the defendants' agent, even though the contract expressly
provided, and plaintiff knew, that the agent lacked authority to make the
representation, that where a person has read and understood the disclaimer
of representation clause, he is bound by it. The disclaimer, when specific, has
then been deemed sufficient to constitute notice, and a subsequent change of
mind will not alter its effect.
A contrary decision by the court would have deprived the parties of
their freedom to determine, through negotiations, at the most suitable time, the
terms of their contract, for if the language used here was not capable of pre-
venting a party from claiming reliance, then no language could2 0
PREREQUiSiF Tw-mn-PARTY APPRovAL.
It is recognized in New York that in every contract there exists an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.2 1 It also appears that in con-
tracts made expressly subject to the approval of a third party there is an im-
plied duty upon the promisor to exercise reasonable efforts in seeking that
approval. Prior to Weisner v. 791 Park Avenue Corp.22 there appear to be no
New York cases dealing with the amount of effort necessary to meet this
requirement.
In the Wiesner case, a lessee, member of a co-operative apartment house,
contracted to assign her lease to plaintiff, subject to the approval of the
corporate owner. According to the corporation's by-laws such approval could
be obtained in three ways: (1) by a resolution of the board of directors, (2)
by written consent of a majority of the directors, (3) or, by written consent
of two-thirds of the shareholders. At a meeting of the board of directors the
requested approval was refused and the lessee notified the plaintiff of its
election to treat the contract as null and void. Plaintiff brought an action for
specific performance and moved for an injunction pendente lite. Before such an
injunction can issue plaintiff must establish a cause of action.
The Appellate Division was of the opinion that there was a cause of
action,23 holding that there was a question as to whether or not the lessee had
used reasonable efforts in seeking the required approval. It based its holding
largely on the fact that the lessee had not, until the action was before the
Appellate Division, sought to obtain the written consent of two-thirds of the
19. 270 N.Y. 165, 200 N.E. 683 (1936).
20. The plaintiff buyer brought suit alleging misrepresentations concerning operation
expenses, and the contract proclaimed, "The Seller has not made and does not make any
representations as to the physical condition, rents, leases, expenses, operation . . . except
as herein specifically set forth, and the Purchaser hereby expressly acknowledges that no
such representations have been made . . . and that the same (the contract] is entered
into after full investigation, neither party relying upon any statement or representation,
not embodied in the contract, made by the other."
21. Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Armstrong Co., 263 N.Y. 79, 57 N.E. 174 (1939).
22. 6 N.Y.2d 426, 190 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1959).
23. 7 A.D.2d 75, 180 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1st Dep't 1959).
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